Abstract-Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a keyed function fK such that when Alice, who shares the secret K with Bob, sends fK (M ) to the latter, Bob will be assured of the integrity and authenticity of M . Traditionally, it is assumed that the channel is noiseless. Unfortunately, Maurer showed that in this case an attacker can succeed with probability 2
I. INTRODUCTION
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short piece of information to provide integrity assurance on a message and confirm to the receiver that the message was sent by the desired sender. A widely adopted adversary model is to allow an attacker to play a man-in-the-middle attack. Under this, an attacker Oscar can send any message to receiver Bob in the name of legitimate sender Alice. Besides, any message from Alice must first go through Oscar, who can choose to block, modify or faithfully deliver it. Finally, Oscar is said to succeed if Bob accepts a source message M while Alice has never sent it. To prevent attacks, Alice and Bob usually share a secret key K. If the attacker tries to authenticate a source message to Bob before seeing any communication between Alice and Bob, it is called an impersonation attack. If the attacker tries to modify the message from Alice so that Bob accepts it as an authentication of another source message, it is called a substitution attack. In this paper, we study the above general model where the attacker can play an arbitrary manin-the-middle attack and see a polynomial number of message authentications. Moreover, we assume that the adversary has an infinite computing power.
Usually, message authentication implicitly assumes the communication channel between Alice and Bob is noiseless. For a detailed treatment, see Simmons [11] and also Maurer [12] . However, in this model, each message authentication will cause an entropy loss of the secret key. Maurer [12] showed that after times of authentication, Oscar can succeed in an attack with probability at least 2 −H(K)/( +1) , which quickly approaches 1 with . Hence, in this paper, we consider the setting where the channel is noisy.
A. Related works
A noise in the real world usually plays an unwanted role. However, Wyner [2] showed that it is possible to achieve a secret sharing using noises. In his model, the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than that between Alice and the attacker. This result was generalized by Csiszár and Körner [7] . Since then, the secret sharing problem has been extensively studied (e.g., [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] ). Even though the secret sharing over noisy channels has been extensively studied in the literature, the attention to its sibling message authentication is far from enough. Korzhik et al [4] considered the authentication problem over a (noiseless) public discussion channel under the initialization from the noisy channels so that the sender, the receiver and the attacker hold some correlated data. This is essentially the authentication problem in the source model [9] . Lai, ElGamal and Poor [19] considered the authentication over a wiretap channel X → (Y, Z). When Alice sends X, Bob will receive Y via a DMC W 1 : X → Y and the attacker will receive Z via DMC W 2 : X → Z. Alice and Bob share a secret K. The channel between the attacker and Bob is noiseless. They showed that as long as I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z), they can build an authentication protocol which can authenticate many source messages without significantly increasing an adversary success probability. From Maurer [12] , this is impossible when the channel is completely noiseless. Baracca, Laurenti and Tomasin [3] studied the authentication problem over MIMO fading wiretap channels. their protocol assumes no shared key between Alice and Bob. They only considered an impersonation attack and also assume an authenticated way for a sender to send some preliminary data to a receiver. This framework was further studied in [5] .
B. Contribution
In this paper, we consider the following authentication model. Alice and Bob share a secret key K. There is a DMC W 1 : X → Y and an one-way noiseless (but temperable by Osacr) channel from Alice to Bob. In addition, there is a DMC W 2 : X → Z from Alice to Oscar and a noiseless channel from Oscar to Bob (see Fig. 1(a) for an illustration). Practically, Internet, Telephone, or a wireless system with an error correcting-code can serve as a noiseless channel. We also assume that Oscar has an infinite computing power, and can play man-in-the-middle attacks (details in Section III).
We study the message authentication code (MAC) in these noisy model (see Fig. 1(b) for an illustration): Alice encodes M to a codeword (S, X n ) with S sent over the noiseless channel and X n sent over the wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ), which arrives at Bob as (S , Y n ), where n is the length of codeword over the noisy channel W 1 and S is the received version of S by Bob through Oscar. Upon (S , Y n ), Bob decides to reject or accept the authentication by checking the consistency of (S , Y n ). We regard the transmission over the wiretap channel as an expensive resource and define an efficiency measure for the MAC as authentication rate ρ auth = |M| n , where |M | denotes the bit length of M . Our goal is to propose a MAC protocol in the above model achieving multiple authentications with the same key K. The main efficiency criterion is a minimization of the wiretap channel usage while keeping the probability of Oscar mounting a successful attack negligible. To achieve the goal with high efficiency, we present a natural MAC scheme as follows. Alice first generates a traditional message authentication code T of M and uses an channel coding to encode T to X n . Finally, the codeword is (M, X n ), where M is for the noiseless channel and X n is for channel (W 1 , W 2 ). Upon (M , Y n ), Bob's verification is to check the consistency of M and Y n . The main challenge is how to design a channel coding for this. We achieve this using random coding techniques.
In the proposed scheme, we rewrite ρ auth = ρ tag · ρ chan , where ρ chan = |T | n is called channel coding rate and ρ tag = |M| |T | is called the rate of tag. ρ tag is mainly determined by purely cryptographic techniques while ρ chan is determined by channel coding techniques. The latter is our main focus. With secrecy capacity C s of Csiszár and Körner [7] in mind, if we naturally encode T to X n using their code, we get ρ auth = ρ tag C s , which can be trivially generalized from Lai's work [19] . However, we propose a new coding technique, achieving ρ auth = ρ tag (H(X|Z)− δ) for any small δ > 0. As shown in [7] , when channel W 1 is less noisy than channel W 2 , then C s = H(X|Z) − H(X|Y ). So the ratio of authentication rate of the natural scheme to ours is arbitrarily close to 1 − H(X|Y )/H(X|Z) < 1. Our crucial point for this result is that the secrecy capacity guarantees that Bob can recover T while in our setting, this is unnecessary because in case of no attack, T can be computed from M = M and K and in case of an attack, Bob only needs to detect the inconsistency of M and Y n and reject (instead of recovering T ). Needless to say, how to detect the attack without recovering T is the non-trivial part of our work. We achieve this through random coding techniques.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we use the following notations or conventions. For a positive integer s,
A. -almost strongly universal hash function A universal hash function was introduced by Wegman and Carter [17] and further developed in [18] . We now introduce the -almost strongly-universal hash function.
Definition 1: A finite family of hash functions H from alphabet M to a finite alphabet T is -almost stronglyuniversal ( -ASU) if the following holds
We remark that domain M is not necessarily finite but T and H are both finite. In this paper, H is indexed by elements in a set K. We can write H = {h k } k∈K . So |K| = |H| and h k is uniformly random in H when k is so in K.
A construction of -ASU hashing function with a good input/output ratio will be used in this paper. Stinson [18] showed that there exists a scheme that compresses 2 s log q length to log q length. We state it as follows.
Lemma 1: [18] Let q be a prime power and let s ≥ 1 be an integer. Then there exists an s q -ASU hash function from M to T with key space K 0 , where
B. Discrete memoryless channel and typical sequences
A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with input alphabet X and output alphabet Y is characterized by a stochastic matrix W = {W (y|x)} x∈X ,y∈Y , where W (·|x) is the distribution of the channel output Y when the input is X = x, i.e., W (y|x) = P Y |X (y|x). In this case, we say X and Y are connected by channel W . If the input sequence is x n and the output sequence is y n , then
n be a sequence over X . Then the distribution P x n (·) is called the type of x n over X , where P x n (a) is the fraction of occurrences of a in x n . For a type P over X , type set T n P denotes the set of all n-length sequences over X with type P. Definition 2: Let X be a RV over alphabet X . x n ∈ X n is -typical if |P x n (a) − P X (a)| ≤ |X | for all a ∈ X , and further it holds that P x n (a) = 0 for any a with P X (a) = 0. The set of -typical sequences for X is denoted by
, then the whole type set T
is a union of some type sets whose type is "close" to P X . If 
and further it holds that P x n y n (a, b) = 0 for any a, b with P XY (a, b) = 0. The set of conditionally -typical sequences for Y , given
III. MAC FOR A WIRETAP CHANNEL: THE MODEL Syntax Model. Assume that there is a DMC W 1 : X → Y and an one-way noiseless channel from Alice to Bob. There is a DMC W 2 : X → Z from Alice to Oscar and a noiseless channel from Oscar to Bob. We formulate the message authentication code in this channel model. Let M be the message space. The system is described by an encoding function F : M × K → S × X n and a decoding function G : K × S × Y n → M ∪ {⊥}. Details (also see Fig. 1 ) follow.
• If Alice wishes to authenticate M ∈ M to Bob, she computes (S, X n ) = F (M, K). She then sends S over a noiseless channel to Bob, and sends X n over a wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ). Through Oscar, S will arrive at Bob as S . Let X n , through W 1 , arrive at Bob as Y n and, through W 2 , arrive at Oscar as Z n .
• 
Adversary Model.
An authentication failure could come from a completeness error or an attack from Oscar. If MAC is designed properly, the completeness error is negligible. So we focus on attacks. In our model, Oscar can arbitrarily modify S over the noiseless channel. We assume that the channel from Oscar to Bob is noiseless and hence Oscar can launch impersonation attacks. We also allow Oscar to learn the decision bit for each authentication. Granting Oscar to learn this is not artificial. For instance, if Bob rejects the authentication, he could request Alice to re-authenticate the message. This allows Oscar to learn the decision bit b = 0. For another instance, if M is one message in a serial authentication procedure (such as a stream authentication), Bob could feedback an updated message index that represents the current successfully authenticated message. This implicitly allows Oscar to learn the decision bit. We also wish to capture the concern that even if Oscar has adaptively attacked many authentication instances, he still cannot cheat Bob to accept a false authentication. The formal model is as follows. 
Authentication Property.
We now define the authentication property formally. It consists of completeness and authentication. Completeness essentially states that when Oscar does not present, Bob should accept M with high probability. Authentication states that Oscar can succeed in the above two types of attacks only with a negligible probability.
Definition 4: A message authentication code (F, G) over channel W 1 : X → Y, W 2 : X → Z is secure if the following holds (where n is the number of channel W 1 uses).
1.
Completeness.
If Oscar does not present, then Bob rejects with exponentially (in n) small probability. 2. Authentication. If the number of Type II attacks is polynomially bounded (in n), Pr(succ) is negligible. Remark. Restriction on the number of Type II attacks is unavoidable as Oscar can always choose a message M and impersonate with every possible (s, y n ) ∈ S × Y n to Bob. As S and Y n are finite sets, he can always succeed for some pair (s, y n ). The number of Type II attacks is chosen as be polynomially bounded as each attack will involve Bob (as a verifier) and it is impractical to require Bob to receive a superpolynomial number of authentications. For the same reason, the number of Type I attacks is also polynomially bounded (implicitly), although we do not require this.
Efficiency.
We regard the communication over a wiretap channel as an expensive resource. It is desired to minimize the use of it. Thus, we define an efficiency measure for a MAC, termed authentication rate, as ρ auth = log |M| n , which is the ratio of the source message length to the codeword length.
IV. OUR SCHEME

A. Random coding theorem
To construct our scheme, the existence of a channel coding scheme that satisfies many strong properties will be proved. It essentially states that, there exists a set C ⊆ T n P such that: (1) C can be divided into subsets {C ij } 1≤i≤I,1≤j≤J such that C 1j ∪· · ·∪C Ij for each j is an error-correcting code for channel W 1 ; (2) If I is uniformly random and J is an arbitrary RV but independent of I, then forX n uniformly random over C IJ that is transmitted over a wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ), the outputẐ n of channel W 2 is almost independent of (I, J); (3) In item 2, if the output of W 1 isŶ n , for an adversarially chosen J = J (that satisfies certain properties), it is unlikely thatŶ n can be decoded into a codeword in C IJ .
One might feel that these properties look strange. In fact, we will use it in our MAC scheme as follows. In our scheme, X n will work as the codeword for the message M . I is a part of secret key and J is determined by another part of the secret key and M. Property 2 guarantees that Oscar does not obtain any information about the key from his viewẐ n . Property 3 guarantees that if M is changed to M (hence J is changed to J ), Bob can detect the inconsistency betweenŶ n and (I, J ) through decoding g J (Ŷ n ) ∈ C IJ . Property 1 guarantees that Y n is normally consistent with (I, J) through g J (Ŷ n ) ∈ C IJ . Theorem 1: Let X, Y, Z be RVs over X , Y, Z respectively such that P Y |X = W 1 , P Z|X = W 2 for DMCs W 1 , W 2 and that P X = P for a type P over X with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X . Assume I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z) + τ for some τ > 0. Then, for any integers I, J with 0
when n large enough, the following holds.
1. For each j, C ·j def = i C ij is a code (f j , g j ) for channel W 1 that has an exponentially small average error probability, where f j encodes a message m to the mth codeword in C ·j . 2. For any RV J over [J] and I over [I] with P IJ = PJ I , letẐ n be the output of channel W 2 with inputX n ← U C IJ . Then, I(I, J;Ẑ n ) ≤ 2 −nβ2 , for some β 2 > 0 (not depending on P J ). (0, 1) . Then, when n large enough,
Proof: Please refer to [1] .
B. Construction
Now we describe the construction of our MAC. Let W 1 : X → Y, W 2 : X → Z be the wiretap channel. Assume I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z) + τ for some τ > 0 and P X be a type P with P (x) > 0 for any x ∈ X . Let C ij , i = 1, · · · , I, j = 1, · · · , J be the subsets of T 
We now describe the encoding and decoding procedures.
1.
Encode. To authenticate M , Alice computes T = h K0 (M ), and randomly takes X n from C K1T . Then the codeword of M is (M, X n ), where M is sent over the noiseless channel and X n is sent over channel
, he accepts M ; otherwise, he rejects, where g j is the decoder of code C ·j . Note: In the code C ·j at Theorem 1, encoder f j encodes message to the th codeword in C ·j , g j (Y n ) must decode to ⊥ or a codeword's index in C ·T . As an index is 1-1 correspondent to its codeword, we assume g j (Y n ) decodes to ⊥ or the codeword itself.
Remark.
Note although Bob can check g T (Y n )∈C K1T or not, he can not recover T from Y n (which is an important point of our MAC). This is so as C K11 ∪ · · · ∪ C K1J is not a code (this set can be roughly large as 2 nH(X) and far beyond the capacity of W 1 ). There always exists M * = M such that
Of course, if Oscar can find such M * , he can revise M to M * and break our scheme. The key point is that he is unable to find M * .
C. Authentication Theorem
The authentication idea is as follows. Oscar can adaptively interleave two types of attacks. In Type I attack, when Alice sends out (M, X n ), Oscar can revise M to M ( = M ); in Type II attack, Oscar can send any pair (M ,Ŷ n ) to Bob noiselessly. Oscar succeeds if g T (Y n ) ∈ C K1T in a Type I attack (where
We use bit b = 1 to denote the success of Oscar in the th attack (either Type I or Type II). In a type I attack, we consider two cases: (1) h K0 (M ) = h K0 (M ) (i.e., T = T ), in which case Oscar succeeds as normally (1) , if M is independent of K 0 , then T = T holds with probability by the property of h. We want to show that M is almost independent of K 0 (i.e., SD(K 0 |M ; K 0 ) is small). Notice that M is determined by the view U of Oscar. Hence, it suffices to show that SD(K 0 |U ; K 0 ) is small. For case (2), we can use Theorem 1 (3) to show that the success probability is small.
For type II attack, if (M ,Ŷ ) (determined by U ) is independent of K 1 , then gT (Ŷ n ) ∈ C K1T holds with probability 1 |K1| . So it suffices to show that SD(K 1 |U ; K 1 ) is small. From our analysis above, we need to show that
is small, which can be done by showing that each attack only leaks a little information about K 0 K 1 .
Theorem 2: Let I(X; Y ) ≥ I(X; Z) + τ , where Y, Z are the outputs of W 1 , W 2 with input X and P X is a type P with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X. Assume h : M × K 0 → T is an -ASU hash function with = min{2 −Ω(log n) , 2 n ω |T | } for some ω ∈ (0, 1) and
log n = ∞. Then, our MAC is secure. Proof: Please refer to [1] .
V. EFFICIENCY
The following definitions is presented in the introduction and we repeat them here for convenience. In our MAC scheme, the authentication rate ρ auth can be rewritten as ρ auth = ρ tag · ρ chan , where ρ tag = log |M| log |T | and ρ chan = log |T | n . We call ρ tag the tag rate and ρ chan the channel coding rate. Tag rate ρ tag is mainly determined by cryptographic techniques.
For our construction, the constraint for T is T ⊂ [J]. The constraint for J is 
A. Comparison with A Natural Scheme
In our MAC construction, we first compute T and then encode it to X n using the code in Theorem 1. A natural variant is to encode T to X n using the classic secrecy code of Csiszár and Körner [7] , where the decoding is simply to decode T and check its consistency with M . The security of this scheme is straightforward as T is fully protected. Let the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ) is C s . Then the authentication rate of this scheme is ρ auth = ρ tag C s . According to [7] , if channel W 1 is less noisy than channel W 2 , then C s = H(X|Z) − H(X|Y ). Under this, the ratio of the authentication rate of this scheme to ours is arbitrarily close to 1 − H(X|Y )/H(X|Z) < 1 (as δ can be arbitrarily small).
The above observation is surprising. Indeed, since T in the natural scheme is encoded using the capacity achieving code, the above comparison seems to signify that our MAC does not protect T in its full secrecy because we have achieved a higher rate. Our explanation for this is as follows. The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel has two tasks: (a) the adversary has no information about the secret message; (b) the legal receiver Bob should be able to recover the secret message. In our setting, we only need to handle task (a) but not (b), as Bob can recover T from M in the noiseless channel (if M = M ) while when M = M , his job is only to realize and reject the authentication. In fact, in our proof of Theorem 2, we can see that we do project T in its full secrecy while said in the remark of Section IV-B Bob can not recover T from Y n .
B. Realization of our MAC
To realize our scheme, we only need to specify h k and K 0 , K 1 and τ. 
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied an authentication problem, where Alice authenticated a source M over a wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ) under the assistant of a noiseless channel. Alice and Bob shared a secret key. We proposed an efficient MAC for this model, where the authentication rate beats an intuitively best possible result. An immediate open problem is how to construct a computationally efficient protocol (instead of channel efficient one studied in this paper).
